Battle of the Shepherds

Andrew Wilet Against Ecclesial Immunity

As a category 5 hurricane barrels toward me in Florida, I am doing what any well-adjusted person would, reading early modern political theology and updating my Substack. But enough about me.

The central argument of Integralists is that the spiritual is superior to the temporal, just as the soul is to the body. Therefore, the temporal power must be subjected to the spiritual power. I have struggled for awhile to find an early modern Protestant who addressed this claim head on whilst also acknowledging that there is an inescapable sense in which the Integralist position is correct.

I really should have thought to look at Andrew Wilet (1562-1621) for this a long time ago. His Six-fold Commentary upon the Romans (1611) is a meandering masterpiece. Addressing the “places of confutation” attached to Romans 13, he gets at the Integralist question. Of course, he begins, as many of his day did, with the controversy over the exemption of clergy from civil law. This was a hot button issue during and after the Reformation. A lot of political theology can be gleaned from reading Protestant refutation of the practice. Wilet’s position on the issue is standard; it is the way he explains it that interests us presently.

Briefly, by way of biography, Wilet was an Englishman, inveighed regularly against Papists, a Cambridge man, chaplain to the Prince of Wales, and rector in Hertfordshire. He died at 59 after a horse riding accident. You can still find many of his Biblical commentaries like the one on Romans in view here.

Per Romans 13, all persons are subject to civil power, “both touching their causes and persons: which is denied by the Romanists.” Wilet agrees that in a sense, the ecclesial is superior to the civil (or temporal) insofar as it is “occupied in a more excellent matter about spiritual things,” but this only as to the superior functions, like preaching the word and administering the sacraments. Since these things are, indeed, above the civil, the civil power cannot interfere therewith or direct them. But Boniface went too far, for in other things “which apperaine unto the bodily life, and concerne civill subiection, and obedience, they [i.e., ecclesial persons] ought to be subject.”

Wilet reiterates this in a later section:

“We graunt that the Church, which giueth spirituall things, and receiueth temporall, is superior and more worthie in respect of the spirituall things, which it giueth, but it is not therefore superior in temporall dominion.”

In other words, temporal dominion does not follow from the superiority of spiritual things. But the superiority of the spiritual things is what sets the ecclesial function apart from temporal interference. Moreover, the civil authority has a “compulsive power” to ensure that ecclesial officers are performing their duties, viz., that they are not preaching false doctrine or living scandalously.  

Bellarmine argued that “the superior power may command the inferior, therefore the Ecclesiasticall beeing superior, may command the Politike state.” But this does not follow, replied Wilet.

“Euery superior power, can not command the inferior, vnlesse it be a power cum imperio, ioyned with authoritie: it is not true, of such a power, which consisteth onely in a ministeriall employment, as in teaching, exhorting, comforting, and such like: so the Ec∣clesiasticall, in respect of the matter, wherein it is occupied, which is spirituall; but in respect of externall power and authoritie, it is not superior.”

Wilet adds,

“True it is, that temporall things ought to be referred vnto the spirituall ende: but the spirituall Pastors, haue no power to dispose of temporall things to that ende, but to direct the temporall power, to instruct and exhort, and teach, how they should vse their temporall things, for the setting forth of Gods glorie, the maintenance of the truth, and the ministerie thereof: and if they fayle in this dutie, they must leaue the rest vnto God.”

Clergy are not, therefore, exempt from the authority of the civil power. The civil power cannot meddle with the more “excellent” things that stand above it and have not been given to it, but it can oversee the right practice of the clergy as with any profession.

Wilet appeals to the fact that the kings of Judah “exercised power over Ecclesiastical persons, both in civil and criminal causes, and partly also Ecclesiastical: as David appointed unto the Levites their courses; Solomon displaced Abiathar from the Priesthood.”

It is kings, therefore, that can depose priests, not the other way around. It was a Papist argument, that of Bellarmine in particular, to make the Old Testament examples exceptional and inapplicable thereafter. But Wilet points out that even as David and Solomon at times occupied a prophetic station, “the rest also of the succeeding godly kings of Judah” did the same, “as Jehosaphat gave commission to the Priests and Judges to abolish idolatrie, Joash reproved the negligence of the Priests, Josias purged the land of idols, and put downe the Chemarims, and unlawfull order of Priests.”

So, next time someone tells you that the Old Testament examples are particular to the Jewish polity and not reflective of the inherent duty of all magistrates, just tell them they are being a Papist. (And there are many, many supposed Protestant “thought leaders” that deserve that rebuke.)

You might add, as Wilet does, that Christ and Paul both demonstrated the endurance of the model just described; Paul even appealed an ecclesial judgment to the emperor.

“Our blessed Sauiour was himselfe subiect not onely priuately vnto his pa∣rents, but publikely to the Magistrate, to whome he caused poll money to be paid for himselfe and Peter, refusing to vse that priuiledge, which he might haue challenged to himselfe, as beeing descended lineally of king Dauid: wherein he was an example vnto vs of obedi∣ence to be yeelded vnto Ciuill gouernors: So also S. Paul following his masters steps was obedient to the magistrate, and appealed vnto Cesar, Act. 16.”

Hence, “the tyrannie and idolatrie of the Pope may be gainsaid, and resisted.” This follows both from the aforementioned arrangement (despite the superiority of spiritual things) and form the duty of the civil authority to care for religion by ensuring that false doctrine is not being preached and that ecclesial persons are living upright. The false doctrine of the Pope was, inter alia, the subversion of the temporal authorities established by God (not to mention his claim to universal headship over the church).

If ecclesial immunity violates Romans 13 then the magistrate must have a religious interest, both in its stability, health, and in the proper exercise of ecclesial offices. As I’ve said before, it is the religious interest of the magistrate that the Papists had diminished and the Reformers endeavored to elevate—a central contention of the Reformation.

Wilet takes up the subject—the positive proscriptions—now in earnest. He begins with an illustrative hypothetical, a kind of state of nature inquiry. (n.b., the numbering is off in the original; I am also not modernizing the spelling below.)

1. There is in the Commonwealth, a superior authoritie, called architectonica, as the fra∣mer and chiefe builder of the Commonwealth, to the which it belongeth to institute and ordaine lawes, and to see that iustice be exercised according to those lawes: this beeing the supreame and highest authoritie, can not be in subiects, and so not in the Ecclesiasticall per∣sons, but in the king onely.

2. To this power, it belongeth to prouide for the good in generall, that belongeth to the subiects, whether it be ciuill or spirituall: for the good of the subiects is the intendment of the lawmaker.

3. Yet least this power should erre in making of lawes, it receiueth direction for the ci∣uill lawes, from the rule of equitie and prudence, confirmed by experience; for Ecclesiasti∣call lawes, from the word of God.

4. Vnder this supreame authoritie, there is the Ciuill, and Ecclesiasticall power: but not alike: the Ciuill is simply inferior vnto it, altogether depending of it, but the Ecclesiasticall, though it be subiect vnto it, in respect of the externall policie, yet in respect of the obiect, which is spirituall, the word of God, and of that direction, which it giueth out of the same to the magistrate, it is not simply inferior as the other.

4. This supreame architectonicall power, though properly it be ciuill in respect of the ob∣iect, acts, condition, and state thereof, yet in some sort it is also an Ecclesiasticall power, as it hath ouersight also of the Church.

5. This princely power, though it haue the ouersight and chiefe care of Church and Commonwealth, as the chiefe steward, and disposer: yet it can not execute all the offices and functions belonging to either: as some it can not excuse, ob defectum facultatis, for want of facultie and skill, as to minister Physick, to teach in schooles: some, for the defect of dignitie in the things themselues, which beeing base are not incident into the maiestie of the King, as to digge, to plow, and such like: some, propter defectum iuris, for the defect of lawfull right and calling, as the Prince is not to preach the word, to conferre orders, to minister the Sacraments, because he is not thereunto called nor appointed.

6. This supreame and Princely power, though it be incident both to the Christians and Pagane magistrats, yet it is so much the more perfect in a Christian gouernment, in as much as both of himselfe, by the light of nature, and in himselfe by direction from others in ciuill things, and by illumination of Gods spirit within, and iustruction without in spirituall mat∣ters, he hath better vnderstanding.

Accordingly, 1) magistrates must extend “care and watchfulness” to religion and ecclesiastical affairs, which “even the heathen did ascribe unto their kings (see Aristotle, Politics 3.10); 2) this includes the magistrate’s combating pluralism (“confused mixture of religions”), idolatry, and “strange worship,” blasphemy, and heresy; 3) this does not imply that a magistrate is to take on ecclesial function, the preaching of the word, administration of the sacraments, or the construction of doctrine, nor internal church discipline; 4) the magistrate is to make sure that the ministry is well-staffed, so to speak, and uncorrupted—the personnel of the ministry is a heavy emphasis in Wilet for reasons already stated.

Constantine and Theodosius, unsurprisingly, are the models. They called synods but did not give “rules of faith.” They judged ecclesial controversies but did not usurp ecclesial autonomy. There is an interaction between the two powers maintained by Wilet. The civil authority is generally to defer to the teaching of the church and maintain it, submit to its prophetic witness, but also hold the ministry accountable to the teaching of the church (and of God’s word).

How can the civil magistrate possibly judge ecclesial controversies or exercise judgment over errant ministers? Well, responds Wilet, “knowledge of religion is required of the Prince.” It is intricate to his duty and office. So, yes, at the end of the day, the Christian prince does exercise theological discretion, necessarily so. Otherwise he could never follow in the footsteps of Josiah and reform the church.

“Moses prescribed vnto Israel a forme of worship, Ioshua caused the people to be circumcised, Iosh. 5. Dauid disposed the ministeriall offices of the Tabernacle, and appointed the Leuites and Priests their orders and courses, 1. Chron. 23. Hezekiah pulled downe the brasen serpent: Iosias tooke away idols: so did other Christian Emperors make Ecclesiasti∣call lawes… Salomon deposed Abiathar: Iehosaphat appointed the Leuites to teach in the cities, 2. Chron. 19. Constantinus the great, heard the controversie betweene Donatus and Cecili∣anus, and iudged it: Euseb. lib. 10. c. 5. Theodosius commanded the Nestorian Bishops to be deposed: leg. 2. C. de sum. Trinitat. he appointed Nectorius to be Bishop of Constantinople: Socrat. lib. 5. c. 19. Iustinian deposeth a Bishop that had a suspected woman in his house.”

(That last one hits a little harder in 2024.)

This is not exceptional meddling. This is the Constantinian vision recovered by Protestants. As I pointed out earlier today in commentary on Edward Dorr’s 1765 election sermon, the advent of Christian emperors was understood by Protestants up through the eighteenth century as fulfillment of Isaiah’s prophecy (49:23).

Wilet goes on to address other controversies connect to all this, e.g., whether ecclesiastical persons can receive the temporal sword. But the key point here is Wilet’s confirmation of the early modern Protestant understanding of a if not the central divide between themselves and Papists (i.e., where and why it went all wrong):

“And whence hath sprung the great innovation of religion in Poperie, from the puritie of the ancient faith, but from this, that the Bishops of Rome, excluding the authoritie of the Emperor first in the East, and afterward in the West, haue arrogated to themselues the sole authoritie in matters Ecclesiasticall?”