Befriending the Shakespeare of Divines
Jeremy Taylor on True and Brave Friendship
Jeremy Taylor (1613-1667) is a fascinating figure, known for the eloquence and grace of his pen. A Laudian, he didn’t have a great time during the Protectorate, but seems to have maintained the respect of his peers throughout. You can Wikipedia his biography, etc. I do highly recommend Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures (1660). But his short work, Discourse of the Nature, Offices and Measures of Friendship (1657), dedicated to Katherine Philips (1631-1664)—the impetus of the work being her question posed to Taylor as to whether Christianity perfects friendship—is our focus here. Of interest is his breakdown of the types of friendships and their relative extent or expression. Evangelicals today lack this kind of nuance even though most of what Taylor says is intuitive and unconsciously practiced for the most part. It’s just that saying it out loud borders on the offensive.
Taylor opens with a paraphrase of the Book of Sirach (Ecclesiasticus): “we should not consult with a woman concerning her of whom she is jealous, neither with a coward in matters of warr [sic], nor with a merchant concerning exchange.”
By contrast, conversing with a friend about friendship is like conversing with a spiritual person about religion. It is profitable. There’s already a lesson here. Don’t converse with people who are discredited in relation to the topic at hand, and certainly don’t take their advice. Reason and experience are intertwined.
Taylor reports early that the New Testament, whilst employing the word, “friend,” has little to say about its nature or composition. “There is mention of [friendship of the world,] and it is said to be enmity with God; but the word is no where else named, or to any other purpose in all the New-Testament.”
In general, “friend is of a large signification; and means all relations and societies, and whatsoever is not enemy.” But Taylor knows that his interlocutor is looking for something deeper, viz., something like the greatest “nobility” and “union” “of which brave men and women are capable.” For the Christian, friendship is wrapped up in charity. “Christian Charity is friendship to all the world.” In this high level sense, the Christian knows no enemy.
“Nature hath made friendships, and societies, relations and endearments; and by something or other we relate to all the world; there is enough in every man that is willing, to make him become our friend; but when men contract friendships, they inclose the Commons; and what Nature intended should be every mans, we make proper to two or three.”
[…]
“But when Christianity came to renew our nature and to restore our lawes, and to increase her priviledges, and to make her aptness to become religion, then it was declared that our friendships were to be as universal as our conversation; that is, actual to all with whom we converse, and potentially extended unto those with whom we did not. For he who was to treat his enemies with forgiveness and prayers, and love and beneficence was indeed to have no enemies, and to have all friends.”
[…]
“So that to your question, how far a Dear and perfect friendship is authoris'd by the principles of Christianity? The answer is ready and easy. It is warranted to extend to all mankind.”
Indeed, “it were well if you could love, and if you could benefit all mankinde; for I conceive that is the sum of all friendships.”
If you could… but you can’t. That’s the point. Friendships this side of heaven are but a foretaste of what is to come. But they now remain metaphysically imperfect because of our finitude—we could add spatial limitations which are in some sense transcended by glorified existence.
“I confess this is not to be expected of us in this world; but as all our graces here are but imperfect, that is, at the best they are but tendencies to glory, so our friendships are imperfect too, and but beginnings of a celestial friendship.”
In this present reality, the expression and actualization of friendship is necessarily limited by time, space, circumstance, and affinity, by nature and Providence. As we will see, Taylor does not rest his definition of friendship on pure proximity, though it is no less than that. Mutual benefit, understanding, and similarity are intricate to what we might call finite friendship. That is, human friendship. (By contrast, the aspirant universalism that marks liberal societies is dependent on the infinite, inhuman friendship of all mankind.)
“Nature and the Religion are the bands of friendships; excellency and usefulness are its great indearments: society and neighbourhood, that is, the possibilities and the circumstances of converse are the determinations and actualities of it. Now when men either are unnatural, or irreligious, they will not be friends; when they are neither excellent nor useful, they are not worthy to be friends; when they are strangers or unknown, they cannot be friends actually and practically; but yet, as any man hath anything of the good, contrary to those evils, so he can have and must have his share of friendship.”
Now we come to a passage that exhibits Taylor’s superb prose. It is moving and worth quoting at length—note the obvious reference to the execution of Charles I.
“For thus the Sun is the eye of the World; and he is indifferent to the Negro, or the cold Russian, to them that dwell under the line, and them that stand neer the Tropicks, the scalded Indian or the poor boy that shakes at the foot of the Riphean hills; but the fluxures of the heaven and the earth, the conveniency of aboad, and the approaches to the North or South respectively change the emanations of his beams; not that they do not pass alwayes from him, but that they are not equally received below, but by periods and changes, by little inlets and reflections, they receive what they can; and some have only a dark day and a long night from him, snowes and white cattel, a miserable life, and a perpetual harvest of Catarrhes and consumptions, apoplexies and dead-palsies; but some have splendid ires, and aromatick spices, rich wines, and well digested fruits, great wit and great courage; because they dwell in his eye, and look in his face, and are the Courtiers of the Sun, and wait upon him in his Chambers of the East;
[J]ust so is it in friendships: some are worthy, and some are necessary; some dwell hard by and are fitted for converse; Nature joyns some to us, and Religion combines us with others; society and accidents, parity of fortune, and equal dispositions do actuate our friendships: which of themselves and in their prime disposition are prepared for all mankind according as anyone can receive them. We see this best exemplified by two instances and expressions of friendships and charity: viz. Almes and Prayers; Every one that needs relief is equally the object of our charity;
[B]ut though to all mankind in equal needs we ought to be alike in charity; yet we signifie this severally and by limits, and distinct measures: the poor man that is near me, he whom I meet, he whom I love, he whom I fancy, he who did me benefit, he who relates to my family, he rather then another, because my expressions being finite and narrow, and cannot ex∣tend to all in equal significations, must be appropriate to those whose circumstances best fit me: and yet even to all I give my almes: to all the world that needs them; I pray for all mankind, I am grieved at every sad story I hear; I am troubled when I hear of a pretty bride murdered in her bride-chamber by an ambitious and enrag'd Rival;
I shed a tear when I am told that a brave King was misunderstood, then slandered, then imprisoned, and then put to death by evil men: and I can never read the story of the Parisian Massacre, or the Sicilian vespers, but my blood curdles and I am disorder'd by two or three affections. A good man is a friend to all the world; and he is not truly charitable that does not wish well, and do good to all mankind in what he can; but though we must pray for all men, yet we say speciall Letanies for brave Kings and holy Prelates, and the wise Guides of souls; for our Brethren and Relations, our Wives and Children.
The effect of this consideration is, that the Universal friendship of which I speak, must be limited, because we are so.
[…]
“It must therefore follow, that our friendships to mankinde may admit variety as does our conversation; and as by nature we are made sociable to all, so we are friendly; but as all cannot actually be of our society, so neither can all be admitted to a speciall, actuall friendship.”
And so,
“To some we can, and therefore there are nearer friendships to some then to others, according as there are natural or civil nearnesses, relations and societies; and as I cannot expresse my friendships to all in equal measures and significations, that is, as I cannot do benefits to all alike, so neither am I tied to love all alike: for although there is much reason to love every man; yet there are more reasons to love, some then others.”
Note again, the basis for greater love to those near to you is not limited to proximity, i.e., whoever happens to be within arms length at any given moment. Rather, nearness is defined according to “natural or civil” proximity, that of “relations and societies.” There is good reason to love some more than others. Christianity has not destroyed this. Grace does not abrogate nature, etc. Finite friendship yields particularized loves.
“I must love more, where there is more reason; and where ther's a special affection and a great readiness to do good and to delight in certain persons towards each other, there is that special charity and indearment [sic] which Philosophy calls friendships; but our Religion calls love or charity.”
For “Friendship is the nearest love, and nearest society.”
Taylor goes on to talk about how goodness and love are intertwined, and how true friendship is the greatest, perhaps singular, inducement of sacrifice. We are only friends with people we think worthy of friendship. Only here does reciprocity and mutual reliance emerge. “[I]t is a prostitution of the bravery of friendship to spend it upon impertinent people.” The worthy friend is the friend that is good. The good friend is the one who can do the most good for you, and you, in return, the most good for him. Worthiness and goodness are inseparable. “True and brave friendships are between worthy persons; and there is in mankind no degree of worthiness, but is also a degree of usefulness, and by every thing by which a man is excellent, I may be profited.”
Taylor includes further advice on how to select and grade, so to speak, friends; what we should die for, what we should live for, and how heaven will perfect it. Classical and Biblical examples are cited.
“And yet there is a limit even to friendship. It must be as great as our friend fairely [sic] needs in all things where we are not tied up by a former duty, to God, to our selves, or some pre-obliging relative.” Personal friendships must be limited by natural and holy obligations. Society should preserve and promote these things, but outside of these givens, friendship must be fostered as condition for cooperation and charity. Natural friendships are the starting point.
“by nature such friendships are contracted without which we cannot live, and be educated, or be well, or be at all. In this scene, that of Parents and Children is the greatest, which indeed is begun in nature, but is actuated by society and mutual endearments […] That of Children to their Parents is not properly friendship, but gratitude and interest, and religion, and what ever can supervene of the nature of friendship comes in upon another account; upon society and worthiness and choice.”
In any case, no other friendship, in itself, can be allowed to subvert the parent-child relation, nor that of siblings. These are commanded duties. And yet, a true friendship may be stronger than familial bonds, more profitable, and longer lasting. Duty to a family member remains even if he is not worthy of true friendship.
Moreover, natural fraternity is conducive to friendship even if it is not itself friendship: “Fraternity is the opportunity and the preliminary dispositions to friendship.”
“the Scripture which often describes the duty of Parents and Children, never describes the duty of Brothers; except where by Brethren are meant all that part of mankind who are tied to us by any vicinity and endearment of religion or country, of profession and family, of contract or society, of love and the noblest friendships; the meaning is, that though fraternity alone be the endearment of some degrees of friendship, without choice and without excellency; yet the relation it selfe is not friendship and does not naturally infer it, and that which is procured by it, is but limited and little; and though it may pass into it, as other conversations may, yet the friendship is accidental to it.”
That said, though friendship may be accidental to natural fraternity, all else being equal, fraternity or natural relations can be tie breakers, if you will. “[A]nd though I will love a worthy Brother more then a worthy stanger; if the worthiness be equal, because the relation is something.” A “friend-Brother” is better than a “friend-stranger.” But in the case of inequality, worthiness must govern, as was said. A brother may become an enemy and one cannot love an enemy more than a friend. (The same does not apply to marriage for obvious reasons.)
Another beautiful passage: “although nature sometimes findes the tree, yet friendship engraves the Image; the first relation places him in the garden, but friendship sets it in the Temple, and then only it is venerable and sacred: and so is Brother-hood when it hath the soul of friendship.”
On some differences between male and female friendships
“[A] femal[e] friend in some cases is not so good a counsellor as a wise man, and cannot so well defend my honour; nor dispose of reliefs and assistances if she be under the pow∣er of another: but a woman can love as passionately, and converse as pleasantly, and retain a secret as faithfully, and be useful in her proper ministeries […] A man is the best friend in trouble, but a woman may be equal to him in the dayes of joy: a woman can as well increase our comforts, but cannot so well lessen our sorrows: and therefore we do not carry women with us when we go to fight; but in peacefull Cities and times, vertuous women are the beauties of society and the prettinesses of friendship.”
The Ten Laws of Friendship
That the first law of friend∣ship is, they must neither ask of their friend what is Undecent.
Let no man choose him for his friend whom it shall be possible for him ever after to hate.
There are two things which a friend can never pardon, a treacherous blow and the revealing of a secret, because these are against the Nature of friendship
Never accuse thy friend, nor believe him that does: if thou dost, thou hast broken the skin; but he that is angry with every little fault breaks the bones of friend∣ship: and when we consider that in society and the accidents of eve∣ry day, in which no man is con∣stantly pleased or displeased with the same things; we shall finde reason to impute the change unto our selves; and the emanations of the Sun are still glorious, when our eyes are sore.
Give thy friend counsel wise∣ly and charitably, but leave him to his liberty whether he will fol∣low thee or no: and be not angry if thy counsel be rejected.
Never be a Judge between thy friends in any matter where both set their hearts upon the victory: If strangers or enemies be litigants, what ever side thou favourest, thou gettest a friend, but when friends are the parties thou losest one.
Never comport thy self so, as that thy friend can be afraid of thee.
When you admonish your friend, let it be without bitternesse; when you chide him, let it be without reproach; when you praise him, let it be with worthy purposes.
When all things else are equal preferre an old friend before a new.
After all this, treat thy friend nobly, love to be with him, do to him all the worthinesses of love and fair endearment, according to thy capacity and his.
Read the whole thing. It’s refreshing, inspiring and, at times, even devotional.
On Proximity
Brief applications are in order. Taylor’s focus is not chiefly political or social in that sense.
As I noted already, the test is not simple proximity, as some today insist. Finitude is certainly a restriction as to application and actualization. But it is simplistic to end there. Every man is our neighbor in the sense that we should not do ill to him or wish evil on him, but should desire and, when possible, promote his good. But not every man is a friend in the true sense described.
Moreover, the gradation of friendship is not immune to natural relations, but indeed, ideally, conditioned and governed by them.
As Augustine said, “if two persons presented themselves, neither of whom had either from need or relationship a greater claim upon you than the other, you could do nothing fairer than choose by lot to which you would give what could not be given to both.”
But note the mention of relationship as supplying a “greater claim” to the aid of neighborly love. But mere neighborliness is not synonymous with friendship in this sense. Friendship must be particularized. On what basis? Taylor tells us. First, worthiness. That is, as we’ve seen, shared things, affinity, reciprocity, mutuality, and, yes, proximity. What’s more, those friendships built upon kinship, familial duties, and the like compound the friendship bond. And friendships that directly, without cause, undermine natural relations and duties are not worthy or virtuous, for they do not communicate the good of the parties. So, yes, the person in some relation to you has greater claim on your aid, charity, and friendship than someone merely proximate. Ideally, the two would be the same anyway. Relationship here includes not simply familial and natural, but civil or political too.
Taylor: “there are nearer friendships to some then to others, according as there are natural or civil nearnesses, relations and societies.” But the civil nearness must itself be predicated on something other than physical proximity. It must be predicated on shared things and affinity, worthiness and virtue, reciprocal goodness and trust. Natural and political nearness are conducive to finite friendship and people should look to build friendship on that basis as much as possible—it a reinforcing arrangement and a matter of priority. Family should be prioritized over strangers; citizens over non-citizens; allies over enemies, etc. And friendships themselves, even abstracted from this context require some basis for affinity, agreement, affection. This can take on multiple forms, obviously, but it must be there in some way. Human behavior evidences this instinct.
We could characterize our present liberal pathology as, again, forced universal, infinite, inhuman friendship—an oxymoron. The appeal to bare proximity is easily surmountable by those of the infinite vision—it is no coincidence that they also aspire to conquer death itself. The immigration crisis is the lowest hanging fruit here. If everyone is made proximate, and proximity serves as the sole ethical consideration, then western Christians will be easily browbeaten into acceptance of it all as a matter of (bastardized) Christian duty. Of course, it is unsustainable and undeserving of the ideas (only partially) invoked. I wouldn’t be surprised if the Good Samaritan and the like is increasingly cited over the coming year, as the border continues to collapse, to these ends. Don’t fall for it.
And don’t fall for the other tactic, often used in tandem with the bare proximity argument, viz., that mere Christianity, as a universal, is sufficient rationale for duty-bound acceptance of all these “new neighbors.” Meaning, that Christianity alone is a sufficient basis for entry into the American way of life—albeit, if our immigration policy adopted this as part of the screening process, as Trump has suggested, we’d be in better shape. Whilst religion should serve as a condition of worthiness within true friendship, its universal conception in this way, to these ends, is nefarious and disastrous, especially at the socio-political level, and ultimately insufficient basis for friendship on its own.
Recall Taylor’s line above: “Nature and the Religion are the bands of friendships; excellency and usefulness are its great indearments: society and neighbourhood, that is, the possibilities and the circumstances of converse are the determinations and actualities of it.”
Natural relations and affinity, shared religion, mutual usefulness, and socio-political proximity are necessary for friendship. Physical proximity only partially provides the circumstances of converse. Other kinds of proximity are required as well for this actualization, viz., shared language (i.e., ability to communicate), customs, and standard of virtue unto worthiness. This all seems obvious and used to be, at least in Taylor’s day.
Image: Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640), Self-Portrait with a Group of Friends in Mantua, ca. 1602-1606.
Fantastic post here.