For Chase Davis

Edward Leigh on the Fifth Commandment Magistrate

This post is dedicated to Chase Davis, minister of the Gospel at Boulder, to whom I dedicated a post last April. He recently and shamelessly chided me on his podcast, before God and everyone, for not posting enough here. Alas, Rev. Davis is a harsh taskmaster, and my duties distract me from my true calling that is nerd work like this. But as I prepare to teach a spring course on Protestant political thought, I carved out the time to produce something to get him off my back.

Here’s to you, Chase. Don’t give up on me yet. Otherwise, what follows has absolutely nothing to do with my friend, Chase. The picture above is of Edward, not Chase.

Very little work is done on Edward Leigh (1602-1671). The only serious study I know of is by James Dolezal: a worthwhile survey of Leigh’s method published in the Westminster Theological Journal during my senior year of high school. Now, Leigh appears to have done nothing groundbreaking in his theological writing despite being a notable Hebraist and well regarded in his own day, and that he was, like many of his contemporaries, seemingly polymathic. (He was cited by Steve Meister just last week in Credo Magazine which is what made me think of him again and set out to rework my notes on his treatment of the Fifth Commandment within his Systeme or Body of Divinity (1654).) The utility of Leigh for us today is his representation of the orthodox consensus.

Briefly on Leigh’s life. He was a lawyer and politician. Never ordained. He took a B.A. and M.A. from Oxford before proceeding to Middle Temple to train as a barrister—an unusually precocious path given that most aspiring lawyers chose either dropped out of Oxbridge early to go to one of the Inns or did not attend college at all. He was landed gentry and fought in the civil war as a colonel. He sat in parliament before being expelled at Pride’s Purge (1648). Most notably, for our purposes, he was a Westminster Divine. He wrote on legal theory, history, theology, and philology. His Body of Divinity published in 1654 and again in 1662 is most remembered of which facsimiles are available but, to my knowledge, has not remained in print. His works like Selected and Choice Observations concerning the Twelve First Caesars, Emperours of Rome (1635) are, obviously, less remembered.

His commentary on the Fifth Commandment in his Body of Divinity is worth perusal because, like much of his book, it represents the general consensus of the time in abbreviated form.

Exodus 20:12 is the text under review, of course: Honour thy Father and thy Mother, that thy daies may be long upon the Land which the LORD thy God giveth thee. And like most commentators at the time, Leigh takes this to imply more duties, more hierarchy, beyond the familial, albeit he does spend considerable time expounding the obvious first. Then he arrives at the ecclesiastical context, reciprocal duties existing between the ministers and people. Already established in that part of the discussion is that a God-ordained relationship between superiors and inferiors exists. Likewise in the commonwealth. There, between magistrates and subjects. Inequality is the theme here.

Key quote:

“In the Heavens there are two great lights, and they are not equal; in Earth there is the Lion among Beasts, in the Sea the Leviathan among fishes, in the air the Eagle among Fowls. God hath not equaled men in their naturals, stature, senses, in their intellect or graces.”

Table for a moment that Ben Franklin would’ve objected to the invocation of the eagle and suggested instead the noble but brainless turkey. In any case, Leigh’s contention is clear: some men are ordained by God in both ability and then corresponding office, to govern others. Do not make me tap the Master and Commander sign! This inequality is natural and is, or should be, expressed socially. “It is the will of God that some men should rule over others, 2 Sam. 23:3-4.”

None of this gives license to tyranny, of course. But just as today Evangelicals now shun the arguments of nature for distinction between the sexes, opting for bare, positivistic Biblical proscription—as if Scripture is arbitrary and detached from the Creator’s creation—so too do most westerners do so when it comes to socio-political life.

First, Leigh lists the ways that subjects should honor magistrates through obedience, reverence, tribute, and prayer. No talk here of resistance or tyrannicide.

Then, Leigh gets into the origin, office, and power of the magistrate. Again, do not expect anything earth-shattering, assuming you’ve done the reading. This is boilerplate seventeenth century Reformed orthodoxy, and that’s the point.

See how high Leigh speaks of magistrates: “they are called, The foundations of the Earth, Psal. 82. 5. the pillars and shields of the Earth, Pastors, Shepherds, Saviours, the Stay of our Tribes, Cyrus my Shepherd, Fathers.” Vermigli says the same in the Common Places, by the way, on the title of pastor and father—I wrote about it here.

Government is a necessity post-fall to restrain men and because he is sociable, but Leigh recalls that even pre-fall, God established government among the angels. So, it is not purely, in itself, a product of the fall for the God of order. In any case, it is a godly thing, created by him.

1 Peter 2:13 may call it a human institution, but this must be rightly understood.

“It is Divine in regard of the chief Authour, but humane subjectively or objectively, because it is about the society of men, and finally because it was instituted for the good of men. Magistracy in general is appointed by God, but the particular form (whether Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy) is a humane Institution.”

What are the magistrate’s duties?

Leigh cites Girolamo Zanchi for this:

“1. To ordain both those things which belong to Religion and the Worship of God, and to publick peace, honesty, and justice. 2. To judge impartially, or (as the Prophets speak) to do justice and judgement. Magistrates of all men should be just, 2 Sam. 23. 3. in regard of their eminent place, justice will secure them. 3. To punish evil doers with the Sword, Rom. 13. 4.”

Now, given the first duty—and it is the first duty—to what extent can the magistrate punish error and heresy. Here Leigh helps us clear up some (intentional?) misunderstandings held by our contemporary interlocutors.

“1. He must use no violent course till care be had of an information, Tit. 3. 10.^*

2. In things indifferent, and matters of lesse moment, Christian toleration takes place, Rom. 15:14. Ephes. 4:2. so far as it may stand with faith (salva fidei compage [safeguarding the faith], Aug[ustine])

3. A grosse error kept secret comes not under the Magistrates cognizance, Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur [no one suffers punishment for thoughts], saith the Civil Law, while it is kept in.

4. Errors according to their different nature and degree, meet with different punishments, Ezra 7:26.

5. Blasphemies, Idolatry, and grosse Heresies, are to be put in the same rank with grosse breaches of the second Table, because it is to be supposed, they sin against the light of their consciences, Tit. 3:9-11. that therefore they are not punisht [sic] for their consciences, but for going against their consciences. Baals Prophets were slain, 1 King. 18:18. See Exod. 21:20; Levit. 24:10.

Magistrates ought not to plant or propagate Religion by Arms. The cruelty of^* the Spaniards upon the Indians is abhorred by all. True Religion should be planted by true Doctrine, Instruction, Example, but it may be defended by Arms.”

This is entirely reasonable, of course. And, the conventional view (see also Turretin on this in his chapter on the political government of the church). Discretion is required here. Not all errors are alike and everywhere equal. Private error cannot be punished. It is with the public welfare that we are concerned. Even then, the modernist fever dream of inquisition is not what Leigh is talking about. Due process, weighing of the errors in view themselves is essential, and, moreover, forced conversions are not on the table.

That said, more Leigh:

“But the publick Magistrates chief care should be concerning God and the things of God, Job 31. 26, 27, 28. Ezra 7. 25, 26, 27. It is prophesied of the New Testament, Isa. 44. 28. & Isa. 49. 23. that Magistrates shall be nursing Fathers to the Church. God promi∣seth Zac. 13. 2. to cause the Prophets, and the unclean spirit to passe out of the Land. See ver. 3, 4. They are Shepherds, Isa. 44. 29. Fathers of their Country, the Lords Servants, Rom. 13. 3. Pollutions in Doctrine and Worship make way for the destruction of a State, and the ruine of the Governours thereof, Ezra 7. 23. Magistrates are Officers under Christ the Mediator, therefore as Christs Officers they must not onely do his work, but aim at his end. They must serve God not onely as men, but as Magistrates. The connivance and toleration of Magistrates in things of Religion, hath brought in the greatest judgements and cruellest persecutions. The Christian Emperours connived at the Arrian Heresie, and when they got ahead, they more cruelly persecuted the Orthodox Christians, then the Pagans or Turks.”

Law of unintended consequences. The point for Leigh is that laxity in the magistrate’s first duty not only constitutes a dereliction in duty but will also, contra the bleeding hearts, lead to greater injustices and strife for church and state. And, of course, this calls to mind Nathaniel Ward’s line in the Simpler Cobbler of Agawam that he who eagerly tolerates false religion probably doesn’t believe his own religion to begin with.

Does this mean the magistrate’s judgment is a rule in religion, a rule that would ebb and flow according to the whims of each ruler?

No. “There is a threefold judgement in matters of Religion, 1. Propheticum. 2. Politicum, a Magistrate must know how God will be worshipt [sic]. 3. Privatae discretionis, as a man must believe for himself, so he must know for himself.”

The magistrate, in his person, has number three, obviously. As to his office, he exercises number two, which, yes, requires judgment, but not the kind of judgment and authority of number one, which belongs to the church alone. In a sense, then, the magistrate shows deference to the church in her determination of orthodoxy, especially over time. And yet, the magistrate has his own charge and is dutybound to, and capable of, judging matters of right worship and practice. Just as the magistrate has purview over all professions; without usurping them he may judge whether they are performing rightly. This is, in part, why James I/VI instructs his son in Basilikon Doron to study Scripture and theology diligently. Indeed, it is the magistrate in the Old Testament (e.g., David) that reforms the priesthood when errant for the sake of the people.

To recap: 1) the Christian magistrate may punish heresy, but not absent circumspection and public cause, etc. 2) the Christian magistrate can judge theological matters to guarantee that God is rightly worshipped—see Nicaea—and that the church is functioning well, but this without usurping the keys of the kingdom. All of this requires balance but none of it is contradictory.