How farre forth men ought to obey the Magistrate

Last bit of Musculus on magistrates

Since it is men that “beare the office of Magistrates in this world, and therefore as men maye erre,” it is natural and necessary to contemplate the reach of their authority, or rather, the extent to which subjects must obey them. The inquiry becomes especially acute when it is further acknowledged that the obedience owed to God is boundless and unqualified, and, simultaneously, that all power is of God and the magistrate bears God’s ordination as to his office. So then, “Surely the man doth obey God, which in obeying the Magistrate, doth obey Gods ordinance.” A distinction should be made, however, between obeying God immediately and mediately (or “by meanes”), all means being, by definition, metaphysically finite and contingent. The real question then is how far man must obey God’s ordained means when the dictates of said means “can not be performed to stande with God.” On its face, 1 Peter 2 does not delineate the extent of obedience; an absurd reading would be that the apostle is commanding obedience even to the point of ungodliness. Combined with Romans 13, Musculus concludes that the “minister of God unto good” should be obeyed so long as “he commaundeth those thynges,” that is, for the good (for he is the “reuenger of the euyll, and the defender of the good”). In the event that the magistrate does “commanunde wicked things, contrary unto Gods will and worde” it is “agaynst the office of a Magustrate” and “is not meete that we should obeye him in such commaundementes.” Musculus finds this all uncontroversial. Indeed, it is.

Musculus distinguishes between wrongs by evil magistrates pertaining to temporal good from those pertaining to spiritual good. Crimes against the former should be endured; those against the latter should not, albeit the latter (which are wrapped up in the intellect and will) cannot actually be touched by the temporal magistrate. Further, abiding a wrong, as Musculus put it is different from performing a wrong commanded. The first refers to conditions that make doing the good impossible, though the heart desires it. The second refers to positive, wrongful action, not just inability. The first is excusable according to conscience but the latter is not, even for the dissident—unwilling acquiescence (or tolerance) v. willing conformity, or something like that. (Also here is a distinction between bare obedience and obedience according to conscience.)

But the bottom line is that “there is no excuse for him, whiche doth obeye his superiors in this worlde more than God,” and there is a sense in which when the subject obeys an unjust law he compounds the injustice of the one who promulgated it.

All this applies within the imperial-federal, so to speak, such that the magistrate’s obedience owed to his emperor does not extend to violation of the Christian religion. Per the jurisdictional sketch provided earlier, this accountability goes both ways. Given that the chief interest and duty of the magistrate (at all levels) is the care of religion, the allowance of false religion to spread or, of course, the active proliferation of the same, justifies acts of correction of a counterpart (either emperor or magistrate). What else could be true of temporal powers that receive their authority from God directly?

Back on the ground level, Musculus briefly touches “liberty,” concluding that, as a general matter, man has the least liberty in “matters whiche doe concerne others,” especially wives and children or anyone under his authority. All the more so “in those things whiche do concerne the glory and seruice of God.” Horizontal and vertical duties are covered here. “And what liberty can man haue in matters of religion, to appoint what seemeth him good, without the worde of God.” Likewise, “It belongeth not to the magistrate to order anything in religion without gods woorde.” Musculus makes the point that even pagan kings only order religion ceremonies on some pretense of revelation. So to must the Christian magistrate according to revelation, and then no further.

“Wherefore whan we teache that the charge of Religion doth belonge unto the Magistrate, we do not meane of such a charge as the churchmen doe abuse, but of the same which is conformable unto the worde and doctrine of Christe. So that they may susteine the care and charge of the making of ministers, and of holesome and sound doctrine, and ecclesiasticall ceremonies, according to the example of the faithful kings, which ordered the seruices and ceremonies of the lawe, not after their owne willfull presumption, but by the prescript of Gods law.”

Notice (in conjunction with prior commentary on Musculus’ Loci) that this necessarily requires that the magistrate is capable of exercising religious judgment. He must be able to discern scripture to know the limits of his commands as to forms of worship, etc. Musculus does not suggest that the magistrate simply abide by the last doctrinal judgment of the clergy—for it is his job to preserve the church even from internal, corrupt officers—but nor does he flesh this out further than this, viz., in his paradigm, the religious interest and duty of the magistrate affords him some ability to employ scripture as his standard for judging church officers and church doctrine per the limitations of scripture. (Again, here the Old Testament reformer kings are in view, and again, this is all very Erastian, even as Musculus appears to affirm that, in some sense, the spiritual power sits higher than the temporal.) What should intrigue evangelical readers is how little time Musculus spends on rebellion or the so-called lesser magistrate question and how much he is occupied by the magistrate’s duty unto religion and to guard and reform the church according to the word of God—admittedly, the primary interest throughout these very large folios of the Loci.

So much for Musculus on the Christian magistrate (for now, at least).