Wolfgang Musculus on Magistrates and Religion

Or, on the "authorization" question

In describing the character and duties of Christian magistrates, Wolfgang Musculus (1497-1563) considers (in his Loci communes sacrae theologiae) why Paul (Romans 13) did not delineate the same duties and, further, did not direct ministers to admonish rulers for failing to serve Christ. (This is getting at questions raised by many Baptist brethren like Jonathan Leeman on “authorization.”)

Musculus distinguishes between epochs of church history (I have preserved archaic spelling of the first English translation to make the reader suffer—at least its easier then reading the equally archaic typeface of the facsimile):

“For the condition of the Churche is not lyke nowe a Dayes as it was in times paste, whan they were subiecte unto Magystrates whyche professed not Chryst, at which tyme there was small occasion to instructe the faythfull, what maner of menne they oughte to shewe themselfes towards Magistrates whan they were not christened: now it was not than lawefull for the ministers of the word, to tel them of this duetie.”

In contrast,

“But nowe that kings and princes and other magistrates also have submitted themselues unto the yoke of Chryst, it is not onelye lawefull, but necessary also for the ministers of the worde, by reason of their duetye and office, to beate into their headdes, with some greate trust, fayth, care, and diligence, they ought to serve Christ their Lord,a nd kynges of kynges, accordynge unto that saying of Davyd: And nowe you Kynges understand, be you instructed which do iudge the lande: serve the Lord in feare.”

The epochal distinction is between pre-and-post-Christendom. For Musculus, the minister admonishes the magistrate according to the magistrate’s ecclesial position, so to speak.

So, what of Paul? Why didn’t he make this distinction between Christian and non-Christian magistrates in Romans 13? Why did he not command ministers to teach and correct rulers? The question Musculus is really getting at here is why subjects are commanded to obey rulers for their good but rulers are not faced with a similar injunction at the hands of the church. His answer is: well, there were no Christian rulers around to admonish.

“At the time whan the Apostle wrote unto the Romanes, touching the Magistrate he did not meddle with thys parte, bycause there were not Christian magistrates anyewhere, to warne them of theyr Duetye: and therefore he dydde employe hys doctrine to the faythfull subiectes, warning them of their obedience, due unto the Magystrates, as powers appointed from God. And in case that he hadde founde anye Chrystyan Magustrate anyewhere, he woulde have admonished hym also of hhys duetye, wherefore, the mynyster of the worde must not saye, that he wyll informe the subiectes howe they oughte to obeye their magystrates, and that he wyll leave the magystrates to be reformed by the iudgemente of the Lorde, and therein doo as the Apostle dydde, whyche gave noo lessons to the powers of Magystrates.”

Now that answer may not satisfy the likes of Leeman, but it demonstrates that this question was not foreign to the magisterial generation. It was not because of mere oversight and thoughtless conventionalism that they maintained their position on the religious role of civil rulers. And I do wonder whether a distinction like Musculus’ would be attractive to those hesitant to embrace magisterial views insofar as it distinguishes between the relative religious character of rulers and, by extension, societies.

Again, Musculus says,

“But lyke there is a greate difference betwyxte a stewarde of a house to take the rule of servauntes, and a scholemaster which taketh the charge of his maysters children, soo the difference is also greate betweyxte the prophane or Ethnicke magistrate, which ruleth prophane or Ethnicke people, and the Christian whiche is the overseer of the electe and holye people and chyldren of God. For as it is absolutelye looked for of everie magistrate, that hee passe his subiects not onelye in dignitye, but also in excellencye of vertues, soo it is worthelye required of him, which dothe professe the Religion of Chryst, that he must excelle the faythefull whyche bee under him, in true godlye lyfe and zeale of Religion.”

Later Musculus calls the Christian ruler, “he whyche shall be the prynce of Gods people.”

To flag something interesting: Musculus presents a unique take on the magistrate’s power, bifurcating the power of the temporal sword into two swords itself, “two swords of revenge.” One sword is to punish “naughtynes,” that being either the hurt of others or to “worke wickedly agaynst God.” The other sword repels enemies. The first is the sword of judgment and the other the sword of war.

As to the nature of the magistrate’s ministry, Musculus notes that

“The Apostle dothe in one worde touche thys poynte, whan he sayeth: for he is the mynyster of God for the good. Thus good goeth large: and he speakyth more openlye of it to Timothie, where he saythe: Therefore I counsell you, that before all thynges there be prayers, intercessyons, and meanes made and also thankes gevynge for all menne, for kynges, and all suche as be in preeminenence… So that the use of the Magistrate is that we may lyve in this world commodiously, honestlye, and godly, under his governaunce.”

Musculus treats each—commodiously, honestly, and godly—in turn. (The obvious reference is 1 Timothy 2:2.) The latter is most of interest here.

It is the interest of the magistrate that his subjects live not only quietly and honestly but “godly also and religiously in true service of God.” Musculus exegetes ἐν πάσῃ εὐσεβείᾳ (in all godliness) as signifying “the service of God.”

In fostering or enabling the service of God, does the magistrate authority to “take order in Religion”? Even in his day, Musculus says “there hath been much ado about this point.” To reject the magistrate’s authority in this regard is to embrace clericalism: “they do stand against it, which under the pretence of their annoynted clergie and priviledge or priesthode, can not abide to have their abuses reformed.” The other party that recoils from it are unrepentant heretics. This is standard fair for the period. What it reveals is that Musculus, like other magisterials, envisioned the Christian magistrate as an agent of reform—the secular arm of the church and true religion. Both dissenting parties insist that the magistrate’s role is limited to “the publick peace be kept” and that he should have no “regarde for what others do believe or bot believe.” In general, the magisterial reformers saw the “churchmen” as having sidelined the magistrate’s proper role, usurping his power unto bishops, to the detriment of the church. Indeed, the spread of late medieval heresies were usually blamed on this maneuver.

In response, Musculus and others insisted that

“The cheefe care of religion belongeth to the Magistrate,” meaning that “the charge of publicke religion doth not absolutely and in some part, but chieflyu and most belong unto the Magistrate. This the wise men also of the Ethnikes [i.e., pagan philosophers] did acknowledge, which gave the first place unto religion, in every commonwealth.”

For this reason, Musculus says that the principle that the care of true religion and worship be first among civil concerns belongs to the law of nations (ius gentium). And if pagans knew it, how much more should Christians? Musculus makes clear that by scripture we should confirm the content of our faith and the manner in which God should be worship. Nevertheless, that which is known by nature by all peoples should not be ignored, viz., that a commonwealth must prioritize true religion and magistrates, as overseers of the commonwealth for the common good must actively foster this by caring for the health of the church and protecting the esteem of right doctrine in public.

At this point, Musculus inserts a typical analogy, viz., that of the family.

“Is not [the] power which the father hath ouer his children grounded upon the law of nature, which the holy scripture doth also confirme? And who [does] deny, but that it doth chiefly belong unto him, to bring up his children with all diligence and care in the true religion of God [?]”

“Now if ye consider the magistrate, what shall we accept of him else in this cae, but to be the supreme father of al his subiects whose authoritie is far greater th[an] the father is ouer his children: therefore it is more conuenient for him than for the father, to sustain the special charge of religion, and to ordaine the same amongst his subiects… all these things do excell in the magistrate.”

That is, as a minister of “God’s revenge,” as one who “carieth [the} sword,” his authority is even higher than that of the natural father given that the former and not the latter is granted power over life and death itself.

On the question of whether scripture bears this out, Musculus (as many did) cites the example of Moses and Aaron, with the former representing the magistrate and the latter the priesthood, noting that Moses was charged with care of religion, “not of himself, but of the commandment of God” did he “sustain the care of religion.” Upon the death of Moses, this duty did not descend unto the priests but to Joshua as leader of the nation of Israel. Musculus then traces out the lineage of kings and judges on God’s behalf, Hezekiah and so on. The usual stuff. Then Musculus asks a question, “What if the faithful people haue no faithful Magistrate, but be subject unto an ungodly prince and enemie of true religion [?]”

“I answere, It did appertaine unto the very kings of the Assirians and Babylonians unto whom thei wer subiect.” In other words, it was still the objective duty of those evil kings to promote, order, and defend true religion. But in context, when evil kings are derelict in their duty, it falls to the other sword, the other estate (i.e., the church) to preserve order amongst the people of God according to the word of God.

That said, the extent of the magistrate’s authority in religion is a separate question to which we will return later.