Peter Martyr Vermigli, the Christian Magistrate, & the Two Swords
On to the next Loci
Last night I finished my notes from the Common places of Wolfgang Musculus. Now on to those of Vermigli. (n.b. These are non-exhaustive notes of aspects of Vermigli’s Loci that interest me for a large project, not his full distillation of the difference between civil and ecclesiastical power.) Jumping right in…
Peter Martyr Vermigli’s (1499-1562) Loci communes (1576) appeals to the king’s duty to transcribe the law of God (Deut. 17:18) so that he might “compel others to give heed to it.”[1] The law of God, of course, contained more than mere political matters, “but also ceremonies and the worship of God.” Vermigli refuses to bifurcate the two tables of the Decalogue artificially. Each table is entrusted to the magistrate by God, and so too with the Church— “Both of them nourish the godly, but diversely.”[2] Accordingly, “David, Solomon, Hezekiah, Josiah, Constantine, and Charlemagne correctly judged that religion was by right a matter for their concern.” The Christian king, prince, ruler, magistrate (all often used interchangeably in early modern Protestant texts) being responsible for the morality and religions—indeed, their salvation—he is responsible for protecting the vessel of the Gospel, the guardian of the truth entrusted for all time, viz., the Church.
For “Princes then owe unto their subjects a fatherly love, and they ought always to remember that they are not rulers over beasts, but over men, and that themselves also are men.” But they are not mere men, for they should be “far better and more excellent, than those whom they govern, otherwise they are not fit to govern them.” Sheep cannot rule sheep, as he says. The magistrate should “excel the people,” although the office is to be separated from the person in the even that a magistrate does not live up to this standard (“the wicked acts of Tyrants are not of God”), though even Nebuchadnezzar was God’s servant.
Since the power of the office is of God, he is a servant of God and God’s truth, and also, therefore, the guardian of the deposit of truth (i.e., the Church). More granularly, even though the magistrate’s rule extends only to the external, he rules over men who are body and soul, with earthly and heavenly ends. All this supplies the magistrate with some sort of ecclesiastical privilege (i.e., protection of the Church and true religion).1
“[T]hose who say that it is not right that “secular” princes (as they call them) and profane men take this matter in hand take thought for the health of the church in the worst way. For what if a pastor should turn out to be a wolf? Who will remove him but the magistrate?”
For “the word of GOD is a common rule, whereby all things ought to be directed and tempered. It teacheth in what manner the outward sword & public wealth ought to be governed: And generally, also it sheweth how all things ought to be done of all men.”
“So that the Ecclesiastical power after this manner comprehendeth all things, because out of the word of God it findeth how to give counsel in all things. For there is nothing in the whole world whereunto the word of God extendeth not itself. Wherefore they are far deceived, which use to cry, what hath a preacher to do with the public weal? What hath he to do with wars? What with Pothecaries? What with cooks? But let them tell me: when the Minister of the word perceiveth the law of GOD to be violated in these things, why should he not reprehend them by the word of God? Why should he not admonish them? Why should he not exhort them to cease from sin?”
And further,
“Again, the Political power is extended to all things which pertain to political power. But after what manner? Shall civil power require good motions of ye mind and inward repentance? It cannot cause these things: yet it must wish they were had, and use those means whereby they may be had. For it ought to have a care that Bishops, pastors, and teachers in the Church, doe teach purely, reprehend fatherly, and by the word of GOD administer the Sacraments. This indeed the Magistrate do not by himself, but he ought to have a regard that those may be in a readiness which should doe them well.”
Both powers comprehend something of the other:
“Ought Bishops to have a care only over souls, and not over bodies also? What if they give themselves unto Gluttony or drunkenness, or live licentiously touching outward behavior? Must they not reprove these things? Yes truly must they, neither must Princes have only a care over the bodies of men, and neglect their souls. For we doe not imagine that a Prince is a Neteheard or Swineheard, to whom is committed a care only of the flesh, belly, and skin of his subjects, yea rather he must provide that they may live virtuously and godly.”
Why? Because he rules over human beings—body and soul. If he were to govern only flesh and blood, then he would be as lowly as a cow or pig farmer. Only then could no religious, spiritual, or eternal significance be attributed to the magistrate. A ruler of swine may yet occupy an honorable if humble profession, but in the most proximate object of his rule, souls are not at stake, eternity is not in view.
This is not a conflation of the two powers, the two swords. Vermigli rejects (in a lengthy discourse) the innovations of Boniface which assumed that “now because there are princes in the Church, it is said to have an outward sword.” This did not follow just as “there be in the Church husbandry and the trade of merchandise, and also the Art of building, it cannot thereby be gathered, that Ministers [themselves] are husbandmen, merchants, and Carpenters.” And when Christ commanded Peter to “up thy sword into they sheath” it is implied that “Although peter have his sword, yet if he be commanded to put it up, how can he have it drawn: or to what end hath he a sword, if he may not use it?”
Albeit, says Vermigli, “I will easily grant, that the sword of the spirit, which is the word of God, is the mean whereby the other sword, namely, the external ought to be tempered and directed unto God,” this did not mean that vested in the spiritual power originally was the temporal sword. This is, in part, because the civil power, like the spiritual power, receives its power directly from God. Vermigli, like other Reformers, wants to recover the original Gelasian formula.
Indeed,
“For if we speak of the civil power, that is not given by the bishop but by God […] the king receiveth not his power of the bishop, but of God, even their own decrees do testify. In the distinct. 96. in the Chap. Si Imperator, Gelasius saith, that the emperor hath the privileges of his power at the hand of God […] For as Paul saith: All power is of God. In the Code, De Iure veteri enucleando, Law the first, Justinian declareth that his power was given him by the Majesty of God.” [emphasis added]
Vermigli makes the important point that just because the crown is formally bestowed upon the emperor by the bishop does not imply that the bishop is greater than the emperor. For pope Boniface himself was consecrated by the “bishop Hostiensis” (i.e., Henry of Segusio), but this did not mean that Hostiensis was greater than Boniface. Likewise, the bishop who consecrates a king is not greater than the king he consecrates. The normative point is that neither power receives its authority from the other but rather directly from God, and that the consecration is a picture of cooperation, not mediation.
[1] Chapters 13-21 of book four of the Loci (“common places”) deal with civil power, criminal punishment, and social order generally, and naturally, by early modern standards, follows robust treatment of the sacraments in the preceding chapters. Chapters 13-14 (both deal with “the office of magistrates”) are our primary focus here. All quotes taken from the first English printing of the Loci entitled, The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honorable chamber (1583) (spelling, but not prose, has been only slightly modernized and modified for readability). [Hereinafter “Loci”].
[2] “The Magistrate advanceth them honors, riches and dignities. The minister comforteth them with the promises of God & with the sacraments.” Loci, 4.13.226.
“We say moreouer that Ministers are subiect vnto the Magistrate… concerning their function. Because, if they teach not right, neither administer the Sacramentes orderly, it is the office of the Magistrate to compell them to an order, and to sée that they teach not corruptlie, and that they mingle not fables, nor yet abuse the Sacramentes, or deliuer them otherwise than the Lord hath commaunded. Also if they liue naughtilie and wickedlie, they shall put them foorth of the holy Ministerie… For the king ought to haue with him the lawe of God written because he is ordained a kéeper, not onelie of the first table, but also of the latter. So then he which offendeth in any of them both, ranne in daunger of his power. But although a king may remoue an vnprofitable and hurtfull Byshop, yet cannot a Byshop (on the other side) depose a king if he haue offended.” Loci, 4.13.232.